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I. STATE FARM HAS CITED NO UTAH LAW OR POLICY THAT 
TAKES THIS CASE OUT OF THE DIRECT APPLICATION OF 
THE MAJORITY RULE 
Inexplicably, State Farm cites Allen v. Prudential Prp. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 
P.2d 798, 804-05 (Utah 1992) to show that this court uhas expressed an 
unwillingness to make modifications to the terms of an insurance policy in the 
absence of specific legislative direction," noting the active and preeminent role that 
Utah's executive and legislative branches have taken in the insurance arena. (P. 7 
of State Farm's Opening Brief) But by invoking that case, State Farm seems to 
argue at page 7 of its opening brief that the case implies that the judiciary has no 
role to play whatsoever in determining whether an insurance provision is against 
the public policy of the state of Utah. That is manifestly incorrect. 
The Supreme Court has voided other clauses as against the public policy of the 
state of Utah. Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) 
"held that a household or family exclusion clause in an automobile insurance 
policy contravenes the statutory requirements found in Utah's No-Fault Insurance 
[1043] Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-41-1 to -13 (1974, Supp. 1985) (now sections 
31A-22-306 to -309 (1986)), as to the minimum benefits which must be provided 
to all persons sustaining personal injuries." This quote is from State Farm Mut. 
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Auto Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042, 1042-1043 (Utah 1987) which noted 
that Utah adhered to the majority rule on the family exclusion issue. 
State Farm's argument is self-contradictory. Because the legislature has 
taken such a great interest in the regulation of the insurance industry, the judiciary 
must be all the more vigilant in assuring that the public policy of the state so 
forcefully set forth in an extensive legislative and regulatory scheme must not be 
undermined by contractual provisions contrary to that public policy. This, in fact, 
is found in the reasoning of the cases that hold with the majority rule in voiding 
exhaustion clauses. They note, as basis for their ruling on public policy grounds, 
the extensive insurance legislation, one prominent example being the extensive 
UIM provisions at issue here. Mr. McArthur is not arguing for an application of 
the reasonable expectations doctrine rejected in Allen v. Prudential, id., nor has he 
ever. He simply argues that the exhaustion clause violates the public policy so 
thoroughly established by Utah statutory and common law. 
At pages 8 and 9 of its brief, relying upon the single reference to the 
condition upon which a plaintiff may insist upon a five-day waiver of subrogation, 
State Farm argues that "exhaustion clauses are specifically contemplated by Utah 
statute." That is an overstatement. The statute cited makes no reference to the so-
called exhaustion clause of the UIM contract. It merely refers to "policy limits" in 
the typical situation when a plaintiff will wish to avoid the subrogation dilemma 
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described at pages 23 and 24 of the Mr. Mc Arthur's opening brief. It may be 
construed to mean that if the injured party desires to invoke the strict five-day 
waiver rule, he or she must obtain a policy limits offer. However, in such case, 
nothing prevents the injured party from invoking State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Green, 89 P.3d 97, 104, 2003 UT 48 (Sup. Ct. 2003) to show that the failure to 
allow the UIM carrier the right to pay off the liability coverage within five days of 
the said notice created no actual prejudice to the UIM carrier. 
State Farm argues at page 8 of its brief that UCA sec. 31A-22-305.3(l)(b), 
in defining UIM coverage, the phrase "insufficient liability coverage" indicates a 
legislative policy in favor of the exhaustion clause. Mr. McArthur showed the 
weakness of that argument in his opening brief by reference to the UIM statutes of 
the various Western jurisdictions that use the phrase "policy limits" in defining 
UIM coverage and yet still hold the exhaustion clause invalid as against public 
policy. See the section of Mc Arthur's opening brief beginning at page 28. There 
Mr. Mc Arthur showed that Utah's legislature's choice of language is much more 
conducive to invalidating the exhaustion clause than other Western states which 
have already invalidated it. 
1
 In other words, if an injured party either forgets to give the five-day notice or does 
not do so because he or she has not exhausted policy limits, Green dictates that the 
UIM carrier must prove actual prejudice, must prove that it would have likely 
collected a personal judgment against the tortfeasor if it had been allowed to pay 
the liability payment. See discussion below at page 7, 11-12. 
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The slippery slope about which State Farm worries on page 10 of its opening 
brief is really a red herring. Plaintiffs will always seek to maximize their liability 
settlement, will always seek to exhaust policy limits because they have every 
incentive to do so. They will not casually walk away from liability money because 
of the credit that the UIM carrier is granted. The UIM plaintiff must prove 
damages that exceed policy limits even if the policy limits have not been 
exhausted. If the UIM plaintiff proves such damages, he or she ought to collect 
those damages, even if, because of some technicality, he or she has not been able 
to exhaust all the policy limits of all the potentially liable parties. The UIM carrier 
suffers no economic detriment by paying out in UIM proceeds what the plaintiff 
has actually suffered in damages. 
At page 11 of its brief in the one full paragraph on that page, State Farm 
expresses concern that, without a policy limits offer, the UIM carrier cannot be 
forced to waive subrogation and that the liability carrier will therefore remain 
unwilling to settle. State Farm fails to explain the relevance of this curious 
argument. This argument is curious because it seems to allude to the dilemma that 
Mr. McArthur expounded in his opening brief in support of invalidating the 
exhaustion clause. It is true that the liability carrier will not settle without a 
release. So, in order to obtain a settlement with the liability carrier, the injured 
party must always give a release no matter whether policy limits are achieved or 
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not. If the injured party gives a release for less than policy limits, he or she, 
depending on the construction of the statute, may not be able to insist upon waiver 
of subrogation. However, then the injured party could invoke the doctrine of 
Green, supra. 
The Green doctrine, as explained more fully above on page five deals with 
the fact situation where a UIM carrier attempts to deny UIM benefits to an injured 
party who has released the tortfeasor and thus precluded the UIM carrier from any 
possibility of subrogation. The Green doctrine holds that UIM benefits cannot be 
denied the injured party in this situation unless the UIM carrier can prove actual 
prejudice, can prove that, but for the release, it could have actually collected a 
personal subrogation judgment against the tortfeasor. 
If the court allows the injured party to invoke the five-day waiver rule even 
while accepting a settlement less than policy limits, then the mechanics of that 
situation are easy and no different. The injured party would simply notify the UIM 
carrier that it intends to make a UIM claim even though it proposes to settle the 
liability case for less than policy limits. Then the UIM carrier could decide 
whether to pay the lesser amount of liability limits to preserve its right of 
subrogation. For example, in the instant case State Farm could have elected to pay 
Mr. McArthur the $90,000 that he was willing to accept from the liability carrier. 
Then State Farm could have sued the tortfeasor, who would still have been entitled 
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to a defense from his liability carrier. Should State Farm succeed in such suit, it 
would obtain a judgment against the tortfeasor for the $190,000 it paid out to Mr. 
McArthur. The liability carrier would presumably pay out its policy limits and 
then State Farm would have to collect the balance from the personal assets of the 
tortfeasor. However, subrogation suits are highly unlikely as shown in the opening 
brief. 
The majority rule shows clearly that the underinsurance carrier will suffer no 
economic detriment by the vitiation of the exhaustion clause because of the credit 
for the policy limits that the majority rule affords the carrier. The majority rule 
sometimes calls this "constructive exhaustion." Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 
215 W. Va. 297, 306 (W. Va. 2004). That this principle of constructive exhaustion 
assures State Farm that it will gain the full benefit of the policy limits credit was 
not disputed by State Farm in its brief. 
The only economic interest that State Farm claims in the exhaustion clause 
is that its elimination would create more underinsured motorist exposure. State 
Farm in essence argues that it will lose the benefit of excluding meritorious claims 
that are technically invalid under the exhaustion clause. That argument cannot 
prevail because, if it were a valid argument, then no oppressive or illegal insurance 
exclusion could be vitiated as against public policy because each such invalid 
exclusion has an economic benefit to the insurer by reducing coverage. 
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State Farm has argued that the UIM carrier should not be expected to incur 
any expense to evaluate the accident claim since that is the primary duty of the 
liability carrier. This argument fails as a matter of Utah law. Beck v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 801 (Utah 1985) in an uninsured motorist case described the 
duties of the insurance carrier in every first party insurance contract (such as UM 
and UIM situations.) 
. . . we conclude that the implied obligation of good faith performance 
contemplates, at the very least, that the insurer will diligently investigate the 
facts to enable it to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate 
the claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or 
settling the claim. 
These, of course, are the duties that State Farm suggests it cannot be expected to 
perform as a UIM carrier. In every UIM case, State Farm must perform the same 
investigation that the liability carrier has performed. Each UIM carrier examines 
liability and demands all copies of medical records and negotiates in the same 
manner as though it were adjusting a liability claim. There is nothing in the UIM 
contract that requires the carrier to accept the tortfeasor's fault even if the liability 
carrier has done so. Because of Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch, 701 P.2d 795,800-
801 (Utah 1985), in Utah the UIM carrier cannot be sued in tortious bad faith as 
can the liability carrier. Therefore, the UIM carrier can assume a bolder defense 
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than can the liability carrier who needs to concern itself with settling within policy 
limits to avoid a tortious bad faith claim and punitive damages. 
II. GREEN HAS BROAD APPLICATION CONSISTENT WITH THE 
MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS 
The second certified question seems to refer directly to State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 104, 2003 UT 48 (Sup. Ct. 2003). The Tenth 
Circuit seems to be asking whether this Honorable Court would treat the 
exhaustion clause the way it treated the consent-to-settle clause in Green. In other 
words, since Green did not hold the consent-to-settle clause void as against public 
policy, but rather avoided the harsh effects of the clause by requiring the UIM 
insurer to prove actual prejudice to its right of subrogation, would this court follow 
Green by deeming the exhaustion clause not void per se, but subject to avoidance 
where the UIM insurer cannot prove such prejudice? 
State Farm argues that Green is inapposite to the instant case because Green 
involved a "consent-to-settle clause", noting that Green's clause was a covenant 
while the exhaustion clause is a condition. State Farm fails to explain how that 
distinction matters. Both provisions are properly termed "exclusions" from 
coverage. 
But the distinction may be invalid in any event. The consent-to-settle clause 
acts like a condition. The purpose of the consent-to-settle clause as acknowledged 
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in Green is to protect the UIM insurer's subrogation claim by reserving the right to 
refuse settlement if the liability carrier insists on a release of all claims. The UIM 
carrier conditions any payment of UIM proceeds on its insured's first obtaining its 
consent to settle. This is certainly tantamount to a condition. 
In both cases, whether the insurer calls it a condition, covenant, or exclusion, 
the insurer is attempting to exploit a technicality pertaining to the underlying 
liability coverage in order to deny UIM coverage. Both the consent-to-settle clause 
and the exhaustion clause have a common objective: to deny UIM coverage by 
imposition of a technical condition having no economic consequence to the 
insurer, a condition relating primarily to the settlement of an underlying tort claim. 
Both Green and the instant case have much to do with subrogation. Green 
observed at 101 that: "Consent to settle exclusions like the one in Green's policies 
are intended to protect an insurer's subrogation rights against a tortfeasor." In the 
instant case, the only reference to "policy limits" occurs in Utah Code Ann. Sec. 
31A-22-305.3(5)(a) which deals only with subrogation. Green's application is 
greater than the consent-to-settle clause. 
If, for example, an injured plaintiff settles with a tortfeasor, expecting to 
satisfy the rest of the claim from UIM coverage, but forgets to give the UIM 
insurer the required five-day notice, then such plaintiff simply invokes the 
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principles of Green that the UIM carrier cannot by such forgetfulness avoid the 
claim unless it can show actual prejudice to its subrogation rights. 
If the intent of both provisions is to avoid the payment of UIM benefits on 
technicalities imposed on underlying tort claims, this Honorable Court should not 
tolerate the exhaustion clause while having effectively nullified the consent-to-
settle clause. Both invoke technicalities that the great majority of jurisdictions 
have rejected on the ground that UIM coverage is beneficial and desirable under 
the public policy of the state. 
Both Green and the instant case involve questions about whether the 
settlement of an underlying tort case has done prejudice to the UIM insurer. The 
essential principle of the Green case stated at p. 104, paragraph 32 applies equally 
forcefully in both cases: 
The actual prejudice requirement that we adopt is consistent with the 
legislative scheme. Utah law prevents an insurance company from relying on 
certain technical policy breaches as a basis for denying coverage. Generally, 
if [21] an insured in Utah fails to provide notice or proof of loss to its 
insurer as required by the terms of an insurance policy, the insurer may not 
deny recovery to the insured unless the insurer was prejudiced by the failure. 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-312(2) (2001). There is no reason why the rule 
should be harsher to the insured in the context of a settlement that could 
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affect an insurer's subrogation rights. The actual prejudice rule strikes an 
appropriate balance between protecting an insurer's interests and avoiding 
forfeiture of coverage when an insurer has not been harmed. 
This language shows that the principle of Green is not limited strictly to the 
context of subrogation but applies to insurance policies in general. The principles 
of materiality, noneconomic harm and actual prejudice apply with equal force in 
the exhaustion clause case. Because of the credit given the UIM insurer for the 
entire amount of the policy limits, State Farm can show no economic prejudice by 
Mr. McArthur's settlement of his tort claim. 
Green adopted the rule followed by many jurisdictions that "an insurer must 
show that it was prejudiced by the settlement of the tort claim." P. 104, Para. 30. 
The instant case involves State Farm's objection to an underlying tort settlement, 
but State Farm cannot show that Mr. McArthur's settlement of his tort claim 
prejudiced it in anyway. Again the cases correspond directly. 
State Farm argues that whether a UIM carrier has lost subrogation rights is 
irrelevant because the exhaustion clause is a fundamental precondition, implying 
that the economic impact of the exhaustion is irrelevant. If the exhaustion clause 
has no economic impact, then no actual prejudice can be shown. Thus, State Farm 
is seen to be insisting on economically inconsequential technicality. 
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Constructive exhaustion also addresses the issue that State Farm raises 
concerning the need to determine whether its insured is actually underinsured and 
thus entitled to UIM coverage. First, this does not appear to be a concern that is 
discussed in any of the majority rule cases. Under the majority rule the UIM 
carrier is only obligated to pay an amount in excess of the actual policy limits, if 
the UIM insured can prove that his damages exceed the liability insurance limits. 
Whether the injured person has actually received those limits has no bearing on his 
proof of total damages. 
III. CONCLUSION 
If constructive exhaustion assures that State Farm suffers no economic harm 
and if the exhaustion clause has the effect of granting State Farm a technical 
excuse to deny valid UIM coverage, then the principles laid down by State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Green, 89 P.3d 97, 104, 2003 UT 48 (Sup. Ct. 2003) show 
that Utah should follow the majority rule. Since Utah followed the majority rule 
on the consent-to-settle clause, Utah should take the next logical step, as did 
Montana, and follow the majority rule on the exhaustion clause. 
Dated this 30th day of March, 2011. 
DIXON, TRUMAN, FISHER & CLIFFORD, P.C. 
I si A. Bryce Dixon 
A. BRYCE DIXON 
14 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that on March 30 , 2011,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of Responsive Brief of Appellant in the U.S. Mail at St. George, Utah, with first 
class postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Stuart H. Schultz 
STRONG & HANNI 
3 Triad Center, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84180 
I si A. Bryce Dixon_ 
A. BRYCE DIXON 
15 
